Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 399-424

  Roemer, John E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

D72; Ideological parties; Political economy; Political equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032325207     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00042-5     Document Type: Article

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