Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 94, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 80-105

  Dixit, Avinash ^a   Londregan, John ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347176987     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2684     Document Type: Article

References (6)

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4. North D., Weingast B. The evolution of institutions governing public choice in 17th century England. J. Econ. History. 49:1989;803-832.
5. Persson T., Tabellini G. Political economics and macroeconomic policy. Taylor J., Woodford M. Handbook of Macroeconomics. 1997.
6. Sargent T. J., Velde F. R. Macroeconomic features of the French Revolution. J. Polit. Econ. 103:1995;474-518.