Principal–Agent theory and nonprofit accountability

Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 73-126

  Steinberg, Richard ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84926127494     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511712128.006     Document Type: Chapter

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