Team incentives and organizational form

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 185-206

  Slivinski, Al ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449134172     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00095     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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