Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-22

  Andreoni, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845866830     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00250.x     Document Type: Article

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