Principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis

Nonprofit Management and Leadership

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 25-47

  Caers, Ralf ^a   Du Bois, Cindy ^a   Jegers, Marc ^a   De Gieter, Sara ^a   Schepers, Catherine ^a   Pepermans, Roland ^a  

^a VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 50849098801     PISSN: 10486682     EISSN: 15427854     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/nml.129     Document Type: Article

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