Strategie network formation through peering and service agreements

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 77-86

  Anshelevich, Elliot ^a   Shepherd, Bruce ^b   Wilfong, Gordon ^b  

^a Princeton University   (United States)

^b LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS; ENTERPRISE NETWORKS; PEERING CONTRACTS; RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; WEB SERVICES;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 38449088671     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2006.72     Document Type: Conference Paper

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