Potential functions and the inefficiency of equilibria

International Congress of Mathematicians, ICM 2006

Volumn 3, Issue , 2006, Pages 1071-1094

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Inefficiency of equilibria; Nash equilibrium; Network design; Potential functions; Price of anarchy; Price of stability; Resource allocation; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK DESIGN; POTENTIAL FUNCTION; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF STABILITY; SELFISH ROUTING;

GAME THEORY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SITE SELECTION;

NETWORK ROUTING;

EID: 84878038028     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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