Network design with weighted players

Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 29-38

  Chen, Ho Lin ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Nash equilibria; Network design; Network games; Price of stability

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; COST EFFECTIVENESS; GAME THEORY;

NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK DESIGN; NETWORK GAMES; TRADE OFF CURVE;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 33749546528     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1148109.1148114     Document Type: Conference Paper

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