Strong price of anarchy

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 07-09-January-2007, Issue , 2007, Pages 189-198

  Andelman, Nir ^a   Feldman, Michal ^b   Mansour, Yishay ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER NETWORKS; SCHEDULING; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

JOB SCHEDULING; NETWORK CREATION; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SOCIAL OPTIMUMS; STRONG EQUILIBRIUM; UNRELATED MACHINES;

COSTS;

EID: 84969256658     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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