The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Volumn 24, Issue , 2005, Pages 98-107

  Corbo, Jacomo ^a   Parkes, David ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Distributed network design; Game theoretic models; Nash equilibrium; Pairwise stability; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTED NETWORK DESIGN; NASH EQULIBRIUM; PAIRWISE STABILITY;

GAME THEORY; TOPOLOGY;

DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 32344452659     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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