Near rationality and competitive equilibria in networked systems

Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2004 Workshops

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 213-219

  Christin, Nicolas ^a   Grossklags, Jens ^a   Chuang, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Competitive equilibria; Distributed systems; Game theory; Modeling

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER NETWORKS; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; INTERNET; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MOTIVATION; SECURITY OF DATA;

COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA; CONGESTION CONTROL; NASH EQUILIBRIA; SYSTEM ARCHITECTS;

COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

EID: 11244286140     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1016527.1016536     Document Type: Conference Paper

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