Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 495-532

  Bengson, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877591907     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.x     Document Type: Article

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