Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 169-181

  Rini, Regina A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900855194     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-013-0163-2     Document Type: Article

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