The economics of collective reputation: Evidence from the wine industry

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 469-489

  Castriota, Stefano ^a   Delmastro, Marco ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROME TOR VERGATA   (Italy)

^b Autorità per le Garanzie Nelle Comunicazioni   (Italy)

Author keywords

asymmetric information; collective reputation; institutional signals; quality standards; Reputation; wine

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; QUALITY CONTROL; STANDARD (REGULATION);

ITALY;

EID: 84925446679     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aau107     Document Type: Article

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