The quality of information and incentives for effort

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 642-660

  Moav, Omer ^a,b   Neeman, Zvika ^c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956441414     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00428.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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