Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 3-5, 1996, Pages 923-932

  Lafontaine, Francine ^a,b   Slade, Margaret E ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^d Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Contract choice; Franchising; Moral hazard; Retail organizational form; Sales force compensation; Vertical integration; Vertical separation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000283113     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00101-8     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Anderson, E., 1985, The salesperson as outside agent or employee: A transaction cost analysis, Marketing Science 4, 234-254.
2. Anderson, E. and R.L. Oliver, 1987, Perspectives on behavior-based versus outcome-based sales force control systems, Journal of Marketing 51, 76-88.
3. Anderson, E. and D. Schmittlein, 1984, Integration of the sales force: An empirical examination, Rand Journal of Economics 15, 385-395.
4. Brickley, J. and F. Dark, 1987, The choice of organizational form: The case of franchising, Journal of Financial Economics 18, 401-420.
5. Fershtman, C., K.L. Judd and E. Kalai, 1991, Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation, International Economic Review 32, 551-559.
6. Holmstrom, B., 1979, Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91.
7. Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1991, Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design, Journal of Law Economics, and Organization 7, 24-51.
8. Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1994, The firm as an incentive system, American Economic Review 84, 972-991.
9. John, G. and B.A. Weitz, 1988, Forward integration into distribution: An empirical test of transaction cost analysis, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 4, 337-355.
10. Lafontaine, F., 1992, Agency theory and franchising: Some empirical results, Rand Journal of Economics 23, 263-283.
11. Lafontaine, F., 1993, Contractual arrangements as signaling devices: Evidence from franchising, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9, 256-289.
12. Lafontaine, F., 1995, Pricing decisions in franchised chains: A look at the fast-food industry, Mimeo. (University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI).
13. Lafontaine, F. and K. Shaw, 1995, The dynamics of franchise contracting, Mimeo. (University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI).
14. Lafontaine, F. and M.E. Slade, 1995, Retail contracting: Theory and practice, Mimeo. (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC).
15. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1992, Economics, organization and management (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ).
16. Minkler, A., 1990, An empirical analysis of a firm's decision to franchise, Economics Letters 34, 77-82.
17. Norton, S.W., 1988, An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form, Journal of Business 61, 197-217.
18. Scott, F.A., 1995, Franchising vs. company ownership as a decision variable of the firm, Review of Industrial Organization 10, 69-81.
19. Sen, K.C., 1993, The use of initial fees and royalties in business format franchising, Managerial and Decision Economics 14, 175-190.
20. Slade, M.E., 1996, Multitask agency and contract choice: An empirical assessment, International Economic Review 37, forthcoming.