Retail contracting: Theory and practice

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-25

  Lafontaine, Francine ^a   Slade, Margaret E ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031542931     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00032     Document Type: Article

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