Multitask agency and contract choice: An empirical exploration

International Economic Review

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 465-486

  Slade, Margaret E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000054448     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527333     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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