Updating our beliefs about inconsistency: The Monty-Hall case

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 67-95

  Baratgin, Jean ^a  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Cognitive explanations; Consistency; Monty Hall puzzle; Situations of probabilities' revision

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749181778     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.08.006     Document Type: Article

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