Sets or frequencies? How to help people solve conditional probability problems

Journal of Cognitive Psychology

Volumn 23, Issue 7, 2011, Pages 843-857

  Moro, Rodrigo ^a,b   Bodanza, Gustavo A ^a,b   Freidin, Esteban ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DEL SUR   (Argentina)

^b Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas ^*  (Argentina)

^c National University of the South   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Base rate neglect; Bayesian inference; Conditional probability problems; Evolutionary Psychology Programme; Frequency effect; Heuristic and Biases Programme; Natural frequency hypothesis; Nested set hypothesis

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HUMAN; HYPOTHESIS; METHODOLOGY; NATURAL FREQUENCY HYPOTHESIS; NESTED SET HYPOTHESIS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PERFORMANCE; REVIEW; WORD RECOGNITION;

EID: 84856916642     PISSN: 20445911     EISSN: 2044592X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2011.579072     Document Type: Article

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