The System of the Constitution

The System of the Constitution

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-208

  Vermeule, Adrian ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional judging; Constitutional order; Constitutionalism; Interacting individuals; Interacting institutions; Structural constitution; Systems theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921384410     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199838455.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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