Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 113, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 147-181

  Segal, Ilya ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Discrimination; Potential; Simultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tat nnement); Supermodular games; Unique implementation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347578233     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. M. Bagnoli, B. Lipman, Successful takeovers without exclusion, Rev. Finan. Stud. 1 (1988) 89-110.
2. D. Bernheim, B. Peleg, M. Whinston, Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts, J. Econ. Theory 42 (1987) 3-22.
3. M. Burkart, D. Gromb, F. Panunzi, Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders, J. Polit. Economy 106 (1998) 172-204.
4. B. Caillaud, B. Jullien, Chicken and egg: competing matchmakers, CEPR Discussion Paper 2885, 2001.
5. R. Cooper, On allocative distortions in problems of self-selection, Rand J. Econ. 15 (1984) 568-577.
6. M. Da Rin, T. Hellmann, Banks as catalysts for industrialization, J. Finan. Intermediation 11 (2002) 366-397.
7. G. Ellison, D. Fudenberg, The Neo-Luddite's Lament: excessive upgrades in the software industry, Rand J. Econ. 31 (2000) 253-272.
8. S. Grossman, O. Hart, Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory of the corporation, Bell J. Econ. 11 (1980) 42-64.
9. S. Grossman, O. Hart, One share - one vote and the market for corporate control, J. Finan. Econ. 20 (1988) 175-202.
10. O. Hart, Optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information: an introduction, Rev. Econ. Stud. 50 (1983) 3-35.
11. O. Hart, J. Tirole, Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 1990, (special issue) pp. 205-276.
12. B. Holmstrom, B. Nalebuff, To the raider goes the surplus? A reexamination of the free-rider problem, J. Econ. Management Strategy 1 (1992) 37-63.
13. R. Innes, R.J. Sexton, Strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts, Amer. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 566-584.
14. M. Jackson, Implementation in undominated strategies: a look at bounded mechanisms, Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992) 757-775.
15. G. Kaplan, Sophisticated outcomes and coalitional stability, M.Sc. Thesis, Dept. of Statistics, Tel Aviv University, 1992.
16. M. Kamien, S. Oren, Y. Tauman, Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation, J. Math. Econ. 21 (1992) 483-508.
17. M. Katz, C. Shapiro, How to license intangible property, Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 567-589.
18. M. Katz, C. Shapiro, Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities, J. Polit. Economy 94 (1986) 822-841.
19. E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-28.
20. E. Maskin, J. Riley, Monopoly with incomplete information, Rand J. Econ. 15 (1984) 171-196.
21. P. McAfee, M. Schwartz, Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity, Amer. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 210-230.
22. P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities, Econometrica 58 (1990) 1255-1277.
23. P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities, Games Econ. Behav. 17 (1996) 113-128.
24. P. Milgrom, C. Shannon, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62 (1994) 157-180.
25. D. Monderer, L.S. Shapley, Potential games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124-143.
26. D. O'Brien, G. Shaffer, Vertical control with bilateral contracts, RAND J. Econ. 23 (1992) 299-308.
27. H. Owan, J.A. Nickerson, A theory of B2B exchange formation, SSRN Working Paper, 2002.
28. E. Rasmusen, M. Ramseyer, J. Wiley, Naked exclusion, Amer. Econ. Rev. 81 (1991) 1137-1145.
29. I. Segal, Contracting with externalities, Quart. J. Econ. 114 (1999) 337-388.
30. I. Segal, M. Whinston, Naked exclusion: comment, Amer. Econ. Rev. 90 (2000) 296-309.
31. I. Segal, M. Whinston, Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities, Econometrica 71 (2003) 757-791.
32. D. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998.
33. X. Vives, Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities, J. Math. Econ. 19 (1990) 305-321.
34. M. Walker, A generalization of the maximum theorem, Internat. Econ. Rev. 20 (1979) 267-272.