Law and the Limits of Reason

Law and the Limits of Reason

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-224

  Vermeule, Adrian ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Codified constitution; Constitutional law; Democratic theory; Epistemic democracy; Human reason; Legal rules; Settled practices

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923029391     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383768.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (258)

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3. See Patrice M. Pitts and Linda Vinson, Breaking Down Barriers to the Federal Bench: Reshaping the Judicial Selection Process, 28 HOW. L.J. 743 (1985);.
4. See Nicholas O. Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial Selection Methods, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 315 (1990).
5. Seethe very brief discussions in Fredrick Schauer, Judging in Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1731-33 (1988);.
6. John Denvir, Proudly Political, 37 U.S.F.L. REV. 27 (2002).
7. See Scott Page, THE DIFFERENCE (2007).
8. See Charles Fried, Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1985).
9. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial Workers, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
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14. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1976).
15. See Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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19. Lawrence Baum, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997);.
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22. see, e.g., Susan Swaim Daicoff, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF (2002);.
23. James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of Career Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits Among First-Year Law Students, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791 (1979);.
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27. see, e.g., Susan Kay, Socializing the Future Elite: The Nonimpact of Law School, 59 SOC. SCI. 347 (1978).
28. See Robert Granfield, Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law School and the Social Production of Elite Lawyers, 33 SOC. Q. 503 (1992);.
29. See Thomas Willging and Thomas Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 329 (1981).
30. See Howard S. Erlanger and Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student Orientation to Public Interest Concerns, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 11 (1978).
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33. Cass R. Sunstein, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
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36. See David M. Estlund, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK (2007).
37. See Garry Stasser and Beth Deitz-Uhler, Collective Choice, Judgment and Problem-Solving, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:.
38. see also Cass R. Sunstein, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 60-64 (2006).
39. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).
40. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F.L. REV. 115, 157 (2002).
41. see also Akiba Covitz and Mark Tushnet, Political Appointee, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Sept. 29, 2005, available at https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=w050926&s=covitztushnet092905.
42. Oliver E. Williamson, MARKET AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
43. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2005).
44. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
45. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
46. Cf. Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366, 1384-85 (2006).
47. Richard Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1264-65 (1987).
48. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun's Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1998).
49. see Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 87 (1996);.
50. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert George ed., 1992);.
51. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253 (1997).
52. R. Sunstein, Response: From Theory to Practice, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (1997).
53. R. Sunstein, INFOTOPIA (2006);.
54. see also Cass R. Sunstein, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (forthcoming 2009).
55. See Jeremy Waldron, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 93 (1999).
56. See Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result, 38 INT. ECON. REV. 175 (1997).
57. Mark Fey, A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Voting Rules, 20 SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 27 (2003).
58. James Surowiecki, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
59. Howard Rheingold, SMART MOBS (2002).
60. Scott Page, THE DIFFERENCE (2007).
61. See Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 273-4 (1983).
62. Christian List and Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 286 (2001).
63. See Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1988);.
64. David M. Estlund, Jeremy Waldron, et al., Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1317 (1989).
65. Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 628-29 (1992);.
66. Krishna K. Ladha and Gary Miller, Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem, in COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 393, 403-05 (Norman Schofield ed., 1996).
67. David M. Estlund, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 225 (2007).
68. Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 121 (1997) 149-67, at 149.
69. See references in Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 173-75 (2006).
70. Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002).
71. Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 173 (Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen eds., 1983).
72. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77-91 (1945).
73. Friedrich A. Hayek, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER VOL. I (1973).
74. Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason, 64 SOC. RES. 181, 186 (1997).
75. Adam Ferguson, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 119.
76. Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 485, 494 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
77. See Jon Elster, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 6 (rev. ed. 1984).
78. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000). http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/258/parable.html.
79. John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 135, 136 (1882).
80. Robert E. Goodin and Geoffrey Brennan, Bargaining Over Beliefs, 111 ETHICS 256 (2001).
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
82. See Geoffrey Brennan, Collective Coherence?, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 197 (2001);.
83. see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Aggregate Rationality in Adjudication and Legislation, 7 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 5 (2008).
84. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1993).
85. Christian List, Substantive and Meta-Agreement, in DELIBERATION AND DECISION 119, 126 (Anne Van Aaken, Christian List, and Christoph Luetge eds., 2004);.
86. See Christian List and Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, 18 ECON. & PHIL. 89 (2002).
87. See Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734 (1983);.
88. See David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, 40 POL. STUD. 54 (1992) (special issue);.
89. See Gerry Mackie, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003).
90. See Christian List, Group Deliberation and the Revision of Judgments: A Social-Choice-Theoretic Perspective (July 23, 2007), available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/PDF-files/JudgmentRevision.pdf;.
91. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).
92. The best treatment is Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006).
93. John Hasnas, Hayek, The Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 79, 94 (2005).
94. A.C. Pritchard and Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 489-93 (1999).
95. Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 270 (1983).
96. see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution: A Response to The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (2007).
97. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, PERSIAN LETTERS 167 (C.J. Betts trans., Penguin 1973) (1721).
98. Quoted in Jon Elster, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 413 (2007).
99. See D. Karotkin and J. Paroush, Optimum Committee Size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 429 (2003);.
100. Christian List and Philip Pettit, An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?, in KARL POPPER: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 128, 138-40 (Philip Catton and Graham Macdonald eds., 2004).
101. See Sushil Bikhchandani, et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON PERSP. 151 (1998).
102. Minoru Kitahara and Yohei Sekiguchi, Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance? 4 (rev'd Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~riron/Workshop/2006/sekiguchi06.pdf.
103. See Carl J. Couch, Collective Behavior: An Examination of Some Stereotypes, 15 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 310 (1968).
104. Jeremy Bentham, POLITICAL TACTICS 106-07 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999).
105. Marco Battaglini et al., Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 409, 409-10 (2007).
106. See Steven Callander, Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 653 (2007).
107. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001).
108. See S. Nageeb Ali et al., Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, 98 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 181, 185 (2008).
109. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Custom Redeemed by Statute, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 93, 100 (1998).
110. Niccolo Machiavelli, DISCOURSES ON LIVY, bk. 1, ch. 44 (Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov trans., 1996).
111. See Robert Michels, POLITICAL PARTIES (5th ed. 2007).
112. See Chris Wilson, The Wisdom of the Chaperones: Digg, Wikipedia, and the Myth of Web 2.0 Democracy, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2008). http://asc-parc.blogspot.com/2007/05/long-tail-and-power-law-graphs-of-user.html.
113. See Jeremy Bentham, THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES (Harold Larrabee ed., 1952).
114. See W.J. Waluchow, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LIVING TREE (2007).
115. Tom Ginsburg et al., The Lifespan of Written Constitutions (Law and Econ. Workshop Paper 3, 2008), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1212&context=berkeley_law_econ.
116. For a recent overview, See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2007) (draft on file with author).
117. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 462 (2006).
118. See generally David W. Miller, CRITICAL RATIONALISM: A RESTATEMENT AND DEFENCE (1994);.
119. Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky, Hayek and Popper on Ignorance and Intervention, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 33 (2007).
120. On this theme, See generally Jon Elster, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
121. see, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996);.
122. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2006);.
123. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 653-56 (1994).
124. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER VOL. I (1973).
125. Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 321-27 (1973).
126. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 51 (1977);.
127. George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 65 (1977).
128. John Hasnas, Hayek, The Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 79, 92-98 (2005);.
129. Cf. Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE, at 26 (Jon Elster ed., 1986).
130. Cf. Don Herzog, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 22-23 (1998).
131. See Gerald F. Gaus, Hayek on the Evolution of Society and Mind, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 232, 238 (Edward Feser ed., 2006).
132. Todd J. Zywicki and Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957177.
133. Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 485, 494 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
134. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/jel.nov_combine.pdf.pdf;.
135. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
136. R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
137. Eric Mack, Hayek on Justice and the Order of Actions, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 259 (Edward Feser ed., 2006).
138. Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky, Hayek and Popper on Ignorance and Intervention, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 33, 38-39 (2007).
139. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115.
140. Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2002).
141. See Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING 383-395 (Francesco Parisi and Charles Rowley eds., 2005).
142. See Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005).
143. Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992).
144. Richard A. Posner and William M. Landes, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 272 (1976).
145. See Einer L. Elhauge, DoesInterest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991);.
146. Gordon Tullock, The Case Against the Common Law (1997).
147. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33 (2006).
148. See Jon Elster, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 280 (2007).
149. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001);.
150. Paul Pierson, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004).
151. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto and Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law vs. Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming), available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ponzetto/PF.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);.
153. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992);.
154. See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
155. See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
156. Louis Kaplow and Steven M. Shavell, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
157. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
158. See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
159. See A.C. Pritchard and Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 494-501 (1999).
160. See Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 221-22 (1997);.
161. Cf. Todd. J. Zywicki, Gordon Tullock's Critique of the Common Law 46 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 07-13, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964781.
162. See Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960);.
163. Julius Stone, PRECEDENT AND THE LAW (1985).
164. See William H. Rehnquist, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 302 (1987).
165. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed., Volume 1), at 519-66 (2000).
166. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
167. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002).
168. See Keith Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005).
169. Edmund Burke, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 183 (W. Alison Phillips and Catherine Beatrice Phillips eds., 1912) (1790).
170. See Phillip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994).
171. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509 (1996);.
172. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006);.
173. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996);.
174. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
175. Anthony Kronman, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995).
176. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
177. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1976).
178. See Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
179. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert George ed., 1992).
180. See David A Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1706 (1991).
181. See A.C. Pritchard and Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 489-93 (1999).
182. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 25, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315682.
183. Jeremy Bentham, THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES 43-53 (Harold Larrabee ed., 1952);.
184. Blaise Pascal, Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum, in THOUGHTS, LETTERS, AND MINOR WORKS 444, 449 (Charles W. Eliot ed., M.L. Booth et al. trans., 1910).
185. See Jeremy Waldron, Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1317, 1322 (1989).
186. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).
187. See generally David Estlund, Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem, 36 THEORY & DECISION 131 (1994).
188. see Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON PERSP. 151 (1998).
189. For a simple example, see Information Cascades and Rational Herding, http://www.infocascades.info/(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
190. Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
191. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. LAW. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999).
192. See generally Christina Biccieri and Yoshitaka Fukui, The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 127 (1999).
193. Cass R. Sunstein, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 66-67 (2003).
194. See Antonio E. Bernardo and Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301 (2001).
195. See Michael Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 269 (1996);.
196. cf. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 2006 (making a similar point in the setting of international and comparative law).
197. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001).
198. Richard A. Posner, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 128 (2003).
199. Cf. Jerold S. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER'S, Oct. 1976, at 414-12.
200. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005).
201. John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 44-46 (Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
202. Adrian Vermeule, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 31-54 (2007).
203. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
204. See generally Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070283.
205. Emmanuelle Auriol and Robert J. Gary-Bobo, On the Optimal Number of Representatives, at 4 (July 2007), available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2007/optimal_number.pdf.
206. See Chadd K. Kraus and Thomas A. Suarez, Is There a Doctor in the House?...or the Senate? Physicians in the U.S. Congress 1960-2004, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 292(17): 2125-29 (2004).
207. Keith Krehbiel, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).
208. See Bryan Caplan, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007).
209. Cf. Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voters' Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 408-24 (1996).
210. Cesar Martinelli, Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?, 129 J. ECON. THEORY 225, 226-27 (2005).
211. See James Bradley Thayer, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901).
212. Jeremy Bentham, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 154 (Charles W. Everett ed., 1928).
213. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
214. Cass R. Sunstein, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006);.
215. see also Cass R. Sunstein, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (forthcoming 2009).
216. See Robert E. Goodin, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY (2003).
217. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
218. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941-50 (1992);.
219. Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 511-13 (1996).
220. See Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
221. Richard A. Posner, Bentham's Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425 (1998).
222. H.L.A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of the Law, 36 MOD. L. REV. 2 (1978).
223. Marquis de Condorcet, An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision Making (1785), reprinted in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33 (K. Baker ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1976).
224. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
225. James Surowiecki, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
226. see Jon Elster, THE OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (draft on file with author).
227. Mark Tushnet, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
228. Jeremy Waldron, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 31-32 (1999).
229. See generally Scott Page, THE DIFFERENCE (2007).
230. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 358 (1994).
231. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007).
232. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001).
233. Kathleen M. Sullivan, What's Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Sullivan, Constitutional Amendments].
234. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Frank H. Easterbrookays of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L REV. 802 (1982).
235. See Andrei Marmor, Andrei Marmorhould We Value Legislative Integrity?, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 125 (Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
236. GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 3 (1999) [hereinafter "GUIDELINES"], available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/great_and_extraordinary_occasions.pdf.
237. See Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (1990).
238. See James McCauley Landis, James McCauley Landistatutes and Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
239. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
240. Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
241. See Stephen M. Griffin, is...Article V, 12 CONST. COMM. 171 (1995). The amendment was ratified by twenty-eight states.
242. See Richard B. Bernstein and Jerome Agel, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 180 (1993).
243. David E. Kyvig, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, 259 (1996).
244. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);.
245. Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);.
246. Richard D. Parker, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE" (1994);.
247. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
248. Dennis C. Mueller, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 223 (1996).
249. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993).
250. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
251. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2006);.
252. Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2006).
253. See Scott Plous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 125-26, 178-80 (1993).
254. See Donald L. Horowitz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);.
255. Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979).
256. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
257. Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25 (1962).
258. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002).