Contracting with externalities

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 114, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 337-388

  Segal, Ilya ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040003931     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355399556016     Document Type: Article

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