Is Liberal Society a Parasite on Tradition?

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 46-81

  Bowles, Samuel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953018031     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01201.x     Document Type: Article

References (64)

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40. These and the statistics reported below are calculated from data from Herrmann, Thoni, and Gächter and the other sources cited in the appendix. (Definitions of the measures and a table of their values are in Table 1A in the appendix.) Benedikt Herrmann et al., supporting online material for "Antisocial Punishment Across Societies,"Science 319 (2008): 1362-67, DOI: 10.1126/science.1153808.
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55. Rawls provides a different mechanism for the case: "when it is dangerous to stick to the rules when others are not" (p. 336) "public institutions" may penalize defectors, thereby reducing their numbers, lowering the probability that a cooperator will be exploited by a defector, and so minimizing the appeal to the would-be cooperator of pre-emptive defection as a risk-minimizing strategy. But if public institutions are sufficient to deter defection directly, the result would be the same whatever the frequency of cooperative individuals in the population (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice[Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971], p. 336).
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