Free riders as a blind spot of equity theory: An evolutionary correction

Managerial Ethics: Managing the Psychology of Morality

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 235-256

  Price, Michael E ^a  

^a Brunel University London   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84921346889     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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