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Volumn 87, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 95-101

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Public goods; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Weakest link mechanism

Indexed keywords


EID: 14944350312     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (104)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.