Theory of mind — the case for conceptual development

Young Children's Cognitive Development: Interrelationships Among Executive Functioning, Working Memory, Verbal Ability, and Theory of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 95-130

  Sodian, Beate ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

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EID: 84920856735     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781410612007     Document Type: Chapter

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