Children’s inferences from ‘knowing’ to ‘pretending’ and ‘believing’

British Journal of Developmental Psychology

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 59-83

  German, Tim P ^a   Leslie, Alan M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035531052     PISSN: 0261510X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1348/026151001165967     Document Type: Article

References (56)

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