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Volumn 104, Issue 12, 2014, Pages 3779-3813

Optimal allocation with costly verification

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EID: 84916920380     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: 19447981     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3779     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (81)

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