Implementation with evidence

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 323-355

  Kartik, Navin ^a   Tercieux, Olivier ^b  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Costly signaling; Mechanism design; Nash implementation; Verifiable information

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862061585     PISSN: 19336837     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/TE723     Document Type: Article

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