Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 487-513

  Deneckere, Raymond ^a   Severinov, Sergei ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55349115110     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006     Document Type: Article

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