Implementation with partial provability

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 147, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1689-1724

  Ben Porath, Elchanan ^a   Lipman, Barton L ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b USA   (United States)

Author keywords

Hard evidence; Implementation; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864799966     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.017     Document Type: Article

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