What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 613-624

  Condorelli, Daniele ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Costly signals; Lotteries; Mechanism design; Priority lists

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860628461     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018     Document Type: Article

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