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Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-20

Optimal allocation without transfer payments

Author keywords

Allocation; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords


EID: 84867289687     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.006     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (29)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.