Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 670-676

  Yoon, Kiho ^a  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Expenditure inefficiency; Mechanism; Random assignment; Rank order rules; Winner take all assignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860642331     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.002     Document Type: Article

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