Hard evidence and mechanism design

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 75-93

  Bull, Jesse ^a   Watson, Joel ^b  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751077831     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.003     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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