Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue 46, 2014, Pages 16425-16430

  Hilbe, Christian ^a,b   Wu, Bin ^b   Traulsen, Arne ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Alliances; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Public goods game; Volunteer's dilemma

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; COORDINATION; GAME; HUMAN; INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION; SOCIAL PROBLEM; ALGORITHM; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONTROL; GROUP PROCESS; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ALGORITHMS; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84911915665     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1407887111     Document Type: Article

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