Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 110, Issue 17, 2013, Pages 6913-6918

  Hilbe, Christian ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b   Sigmund, Karl ^c,d  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^d INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COEVOLUTION; COMPETITION; COOPERATION; ENDOSYMBIONT; EVOLUTION; EXTORTION; GAME; HOST; NATURAL SELECTION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL;

EID: 84876879744     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1214834110     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Rapoport A, Chammah A (1965) The Prisoner's Dilemma (Univ of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI).
2. Trivers R (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46(1):35-57.
3. Aumann R (1981) Survey of repeated games. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern (Wissenschaftsverlag, Mannheim, Germany).
4. Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York).
5. Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 50:533-554.
6. Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1990) Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. Am Econ Rev 80:274-279.
7. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 364(6432):56-58.
8. Kendall G, Yao X, Chong SY, eds (2007) The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 20 Years On (World Scientific, Singapore).
9. Trivers R (2006) Reciprocal altruism: 30 years later. Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Mechanisms and Evolution, eds Kappeller PM, van Schaik CP (Springer, Berlin).
10. Press WH, Dyson FJ (2012) Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109(26):10409-10413.
11. Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2012) Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109(26):10134-10135.
12. Adami C, Hintze A (2012) Winning isn't everything: Evolutionary stability of Zero Determinant strategies. Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.2666. Accessed October 12, 2012.
13. Boerlijst MC, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1997) Equal pay for all prisoners. Am Math Mon 104:303-307.
14. Bergstrom CT, Lachmann M (2003) The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 100(2):593-598.
15. Sigmund K (2010) The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
16. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1990) The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Acta Appl Math 20:247-265.
17. Taylor PD, Jonker L (1978) Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math Biosci 40:145-156.
18. Hofbauer J (2011) Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. Evolutionary Game Dynamics, ed Sigmund K (American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI), pp 61-79.
19. Nowak MA, Sasaki A, Taylor C, Fudenberg D (2004) Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428(6983):646-650.
20. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, MA).
21. Traulsen A, Nowak MA, Pacheco JM (2006) Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 74(1 Pt 1):011909, 10.1103/PhysRevE.74.011909.
22. Imhof LA, Nowak MA (2010) Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. Proc Biol Sci 277(1680):463-468.
23. Fudenberg D, Imhof LA (2006) Imitation processes with small mutations. J Econ Theory 131:251-262.
24. Rand DG, Armao JJ, 4th, Nakamaru M, Ohtsuki H (2010) Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. J Theor Biol 265(4):624-632.
25. Hilbe C, Traulsen A (2012) Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite. Sci Rep 2:458.
26. Damore JA, Gore J (2011) A slowly evolving host moves first in symbiotic interactions. Evolution 65(8):2391-2398.
27. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1994) The alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. J Theor Biol 168:219-226.
28. Frean MR (1994) The prisoner's dilemma without synchrony. Proc Biol Sci 257(1348):75-79.
29. Doebeli M, Knowlton N (1998) The evolution of interspecific mutualisms. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 95(15):8676-8680.
30. Frean MR, Abraham ER (2004) Adaptation and enslavement in endosymbiont-host associations. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 69(5 Pt 1):051913.