Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma

Nature Communications

Volumn 5, Issue , 2014, Pages

  Hilbe, Christian ^a,b   Röhl, Torsten ^a   Milinski, Manfred ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; HUMAN ACTIVITY; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; SOCIAL NETWORK;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; CLINICAL ARTICLE; COOPERATION; EXTORTION; GENEROSITY; HUMAN; HUMAN CHARACTERISTIC; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PRISONER; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; ZERO DETERMINANT STRATEGY; GAME; PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION;

COERCION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS;

EID: 84901753609     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20411723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4976     Document Type: Article

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