Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 11, 2013, Pages

  Hilbe, Christian ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b   Traulsen, Arne ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CALCULATION; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; GAME; HUMAN; POPULATION SIZE; PROBABILITY; SCORING SYSTEM; SIMULATION;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; POPULATION DENSITY;

EID: 84891448588     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0077886     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Rapoport A, Chammah AM (1965) Prisoner's Dilemma. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
2. Trivers RL (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35-57.
3. Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, NY: Basic Books.
4. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
5. Sigmund K (2010) The calculus of selfishness. Princeton Univ. Press.
6. Friedman J (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1-12.
7. Molander P (1985) The optimal level of generosity in a selfish, uncertain environment. Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 611-618.
8. Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533-554.
9. Milinski M (1987) Tit For Tat in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. Nature 325: 433-435.
10. Boyd R, Lorberbaum J (1987) No pure strategy is evolutionary stable in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Nature 327: 58-59.
11. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 364: 56-58.
12. Frean MR (1994) The prisoner's dilemma without synchrony. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 257: 75-79.
13. Hauert C, Schuster HG (1997) Effects of increasing the number of players and memory size in the iterated prisoner's dilemma: a numerical approach. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 264: 513-519.
14. Nowak MA, Sasaki A, Taylor C, Fudenberg D (2004) Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428: 646-650.
15. Imhof LA, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2005) Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 102: 10797-10800.
16. Perc M, Szolnoki A, Szabó G (2008) Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation. Physical Review E 78: 066101.
17. Grujic J, Fosco C, Araujo L, Cuesta J, Sanchez A (2010) Social experiments in the mesoscale: Humans playing a spatial prisoner's dilemma. PLoS One 5: e13749.
18. Perc M, Wang Z (2010) Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. PLoS One 5: e15117.
19. van Veelen M, García J, Rand DG, Nowak MA (2012) Direct reciprocity in structured populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 109: 9929-9934.
20. Press WH, Dyson FD (2012) Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 109: 10409-10413.
21. Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2012) Extortion and cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 109: 10134-10135.
22. Adami C, Hintze A (2013) Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything. Nature Communications 4: 2193.
23. Hilbe C, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2013) The evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 110: 6913-6918.
24. Akin E (2013) Stable cooperative solutions for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. arXiv : 1211.0969v2.
25. Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB (2013) From extortion to generosity, evolution in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA (in press).
26. Ball P (2012) Physicists suggest selfishness can pay. Nature, doi:10.1038/nature.2012.11254.
27. Boerlijst MC, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1997) Equal pay for all prisoners. American Mathematical Monthly 104: 303-307.
28. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1990) The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma. Acta Applicandae Mathematicae 20: 247-265.
29. Metz JAJ, Geritz SAH, Meszena G, Jacobs FJA, van Heerwaarden JS (1996) Adaptive dynamics: a geometrical study of the consequences of nearly faithful replication. In: van Strien SJ, Ver18 duyn Lunel SM, editors, Stochastic and Spatial Structures of Dynamical Systems, Amsterdam: North Holland. 183-231.
30. Geritz SAH, Kisdi E, Meszéna G, Metz JAJ (1998) Evolutionarily singular strategies and the adaptive growth and branching of the evolutionary tree. Evolutionary Ecology Research 12: 35-57.
31. Hilbe C, Traulsen A (2012) Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite. Nature Scientific Reports 2: 458.
32. Antal T, Scheuring I (2006) Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 68: 1923-1944.
33. Wu B, Gokhale CS, Wang L, Traulsen A (2012) How small are small mutation rates? Journal of Mathematical Biology 64: 803-827.
34. Imhof LA, Nowak MA (2010) Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 277: 463-468.
35. Lessard S (2011) Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations. Dynamic Games and Applications 1: 301-318.
36. Hilbe C (2011) Local replicator dynamics: A simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 73: 2068-2087.
37. Blume LE (1993) The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. Games and Economic Behavior 5: 387-424.
38. Traulsen A, Nowak MA, Pacheco JM (2006) Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Physical Review E 74: 011909.
39. Sugden R (1986) The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Oxford and New York: Blackwell.
40. Doebeli M, Hauert C (2005) Models of cooperation based on the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game. Ecology Letters 8: 748-766.
41. Roemheld L (2013) Evolutionary extortion and mischief - zero determinant strategies in 262 games. arXiv 1308.2576.
42. Roberts G, Sherratt TN (1998) Development of cooperative relationships through increasing in vestment. Nature 394: 175-179.
43. Killingback T, Doebeli M (1999) 'Raise the stakes' evolves into a defector. Nature 400: 518.
44. Wahl LM, Nowak MA (1999) The continuous prisoner's dilemma: I. Linear reactive strategies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 200: 307-321.
45. Wahl LM, Nowak MA (1999) The continuous prisoner's dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise. Journal of Theoretical Biology 200: 323-338.
46. Killingback T, Doebeli M (2002) The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma and the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism with variable investment. The American Naturalist 160: 421-438.