Forgiver triumphs in alternating Prisoner's Dilemma

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 12, 2013, Pages

  Zagorsky, Benjamin M ^a   Reiter, Johannes G ^b   Chatterjee, Krishnendu ^b   Nowak, Martin A ^a,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AUSTRIA   (Austria)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALWAYS COOPERATE STRATEGY; ALWAYS DEFECT STRATEGY; ARTICLE; AUTOMATISM; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONFLICT; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; FORGIVENESS; FORGIVER STRATEGY; GAME; GRIM STRATEGY; HOPE; HUMAN; NOISE; PRISONER DILEMMA; PROBABILITY; RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS; STOCHASTIC MODEL; SUSPICIOUSNESS; TIT FOR TAT STRATEGY; WIN STAY LOSE SHIFT STRATEGY;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS;

EID: 84892551444     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080814     Document Type: Article

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