Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 110, Issue 27, 2013, Pages 10916-10921

  Yang, Wu ^a   Liu, Wei ^a   Viña, Andrés ^a   Tuanmu, Mao Ning ^a   He, Guangming ^a   Dietz, Thomas ^a   Liu, Jianguo ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Biodiversity conservation; Casual inference; Commons governance; Ecosystem services; Sustainability

Indexed keywords

AFFORESTATION; ARTICLE; CONSERVATION BIOLOGY; ECOSYSTEM; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY; FOREST; HOUSEHOLD; HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SOCIAL CAPITAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION; CASUAL INFERENCE; COMMONS GOVERNANCE; ECOSYSTEM SERVICES; SUSTAINABILITY;

ANIMALS; BIODIVERSITY; CHINA; CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES; ECOSYSTEM; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; NONLINEAR DYNAMICS; SOCIAL SUPPORT; TREES; URSIDAE;

EID: 84879700844     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1301733110     Document Type: Article

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