Democratic decisions establish stable authorities thatovercome the paradox of second-order punishment

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 752-756

  Hiibe, Christian ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^a   Röhl, Torsten ^a   Milinski, Manfred ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Institution formation; Pool punishment

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; AUTHORITY; COMMUNITY; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; FREE RIDER; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; OFFENDER; POLITICAL SYSTEM; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIETY; TAX EVADER; THEORETICAL MODEL; WELFARE;

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; INSTITUTION FORMATION; POOL PUNISHMENT;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DEMOCRACY; GERMANY; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; POLITICS; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL CONTROL POLICIES;

EID: 84892613201     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1315273111     Document Type: Article

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