Evolutionary Dynamics of Strategic Behavior in a Collective-Risk Dilemma

PLoS Computational Biology

Volumn 8, Issue 8, 2012, Pages

  Abou Chakra, Maria ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE RISK; DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGES; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; FAIR SHARE; FINITE POPULATION; LATE STAGE; PRISONERS' DILEMMA; PUBLIC GOODS GAMES; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR;

CLIMATE CHANGE;

ARTICLE; CLIMATE CHANGE; COLLECTIVE RISK SOCIAL DILEMMA; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84866061213     PISSN: 1553734X     EISSN: 15537358     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002652     Document Type: Article

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