Family Firms and Institutional Investors

Family Business Review

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 328-345

  Fernando, Guy D ^a   Schneible, Richard Arthur ^a   Suh, SangHyun ^b  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL   (United States)

Author keywords

family firms; institutional investors; Sarbanes Oxley Act

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911176523     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: 17416248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0894486513481474     Document Type: Article

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