Affiliate directors and perceived risk bearing in publicly traded, family-controlled firms: The case of diversification

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 32, Issue 6 SPEC. ISS., 2008, Pages 1007-1026

  Jones, Carla D ^a   Makri, Marianna ^b   Gomez mejia, Luis R ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55249116036     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00269.x     Document Type: Article

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