Fixing frand: A pseudo-pool approach to standards-based patent licensing

Antitrust Law Journal

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 47-97

  Contreras, Jorge L ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84910110440     PISSN: 00036056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (110)

1. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 45-46 (1999).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR] (citations omitted), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
3. Standards may be developed in a range of collaborative organizations, from large, well-established fora that address the standardization needs of major industry segments (e.g., the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) (mobile telecommunications), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (Internet protocols), and Worldwide Web Consortium (Web technologies)) to smaller groups often referred to as "consortia" that focus on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the HDMI Forum, Bluetooth Special Interest Group, and Wireless Gigabit Alliance). So-called de facto standards, which are developed by a single company and later gain market acceptance, are not addressed by this article. See generally Brad Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards in the Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS 177 (2012)
4. Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), in 2010 INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACADEMIC CONFERENCE: BEYOND THE INTERNET? 123 (2010), available at http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-t/opb/proc/T-PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf
5. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL ix-xi (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007)
6. See, e.g., DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 2, at 33; Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Global Competition Review Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last Four Years 16 (Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Hesse, Looking Back], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf
7. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six "Small" Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9 (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Hesse, Six Proposals], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007)
9. Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2010)
10. Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 12-13 (2012)
11. J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 128 (2009).
12. See, e.g., KNUT BLIND ET AL., STUDY ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS), FINAL REPORT 62 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/files/standards-policy/ipr-workshop/ipr-study-final-report-en.pdf
13. Eur. Telecomm. Standard Inst., ETSI IPR Online Database, http://ipr.etsi.org/
14. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 152-53 (2007)
15. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007)
16. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)
17. See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fiona Scott Morton & Howard Shelanski, Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 1, 3
18. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1925 (2002)
19. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 1 n.2 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ/PTO Policy Statement], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf
20. There are currently more than 200 ANSI-accredited American National Standards developers. Standards Activities Overview, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/standards-activities/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=3#.UOHdNaVzITw.
21. See RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 89 tbl.13 (2012), available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga-072197.pdf
22. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 181-83 (2013)
23. See, e.g., Inst. of Elecs. Eng'rs, Inc., IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaw § 6.2 (2012), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb-bylaws.pdf
24. S. Bradner, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology, Request for Comments 3979, § 4.1 (2005), http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3979/?include-text=1
25. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 192 (2011) [hereinafter FTC EVOLVING MARKETPLACE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf
26. Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 859 (2011)
27. Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 357 (2007)
28. Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 35 COMM. POL'Y 1010, 1010 (2011)
29. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Standardization and the Law Conference: Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting 5 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf
30. FTC Patent Standards Workshop: Project No. P11-1204, Comments of Qualcomm Inc. iii (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Qualcomm Comments to FTC Workshop 2011], http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/patentstandardsworkshop/00011-60525.pdf
31. Microsoft Corp. V. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823-JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)
32. Michael A. Lindsay, Presentation at the American Intellectual Property Law Association 2009 Spring Meeting: Negotiating Royalty or Other License Terms Before the Standard Is Set 6-7 (2009), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/lindsay-negotiating-royalties-AIPLA-spring09.pdf
33. Jorge L. Contreras, So That's What "RAND" Means?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Microsoft V. Motorola, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/so-thats-what-rand-means-a-brief-report-on-the-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law-in-microsoft-v-motorola.html
34. Jorge L. Contreras, Good Things Come in Threes? DOJ, FTC and EC Officials Wax Eloquent About FRAND, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/good-things-come-in-threes-doj-ftc-and-ec-officials-wax-eloquent-about-frand.html#tpe-action-posted-6a00d8341c588553ef017c32e8343f970b.
35. Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges (Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2309023
36. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2226533.
37. Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 159 (2007).
38. See J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 718 (2008)
39. Mark R. Patterson, Commentary, Antitrust and the Costs of Standard-Setting: A Commentary on Teece & Sherry, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1995, 2001 n.33 (2003).
40. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Workshop: Tools to Prevent Patent "Hold-Up" 117 (June 21, 2011) (remarks of Earl Nied, Panelist), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/standards/transcript.pdf
41. See Qualcomm Inc. V. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
42. Lotes Co. V. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., No. 12-cv-7465-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2013)
43. Fairfield Resources Int'l, Analysis of Patents Declared as Essential to GSM as of June 6, 2007, at 7 (Jan. 14, 2008), http://frlicense.com/GSM-FINAL.pdf
44. Fairfield Resources Int'l, Review of Patents Declared as Essential to WDCMA Through December, 2008, at 1 (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf
45. Donald L. Martin & Carl De Meyer, Patent Counting, A Misleading Index of Patent Value: A Critique of Goodman & Myers and its Uses 7-14 (Dec. 4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=949439
46. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Workshop: Tools to Prevent Patent "Hold-Up" 109 (remarks of Amy A. Marasco, Panelist) (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/standards/transcript.pdf.
47. The economics literature on organizational decision making in the face of incomplete information is large and varied and well beyond the scope of this paper. For a general overview, see Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493 (1979)
48. Bengt Holmström & Roger B. Myerson, Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1799 (1983)
49. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 2 (1994).
50. MHP Patent Licensing Proposals Provoke Protests, INFORMitv.com (Mar. 13, 2006), http://informitv.com/news/2006/03/13/mhppatentlicensing/
51. See generally WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MICROECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 308-10 (10th ed. 2014).
52. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007).
53. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
54. In general, an information asymmetry is viewed as resulting in transactions that are inefficient. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 13 (4th ed. 2005).
55. Bill Rigby, Microsoft, Motorola File to Keep Patent Case Details Private, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/15/us-microsoft-google-trial-idUSBRE8BE01Y20121215
56. see also DAVE MOCK, THE QUALCOMM EQUATION 181 (2005)
57. See Byeongwoo Kang & Rudi Bekkers, Just-in-Time Inventions and the Development of Standards: How Firms Use Opportunistic Strategies to Obtain Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) (Eindhoven Ctr. for Innovation Stud., Working Paper No. 13.01, 2013), available at http://cms.tm.tue.nl/Ecis/Files/papers/wp2013/wp1301.pdf
58. Anne Layne-Farrar, Assessing IPR Disclosure Within Standard Setting: An ICT Case Study (Nov. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1912198
59. see also Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, Conversation with Secrets (May 31, 2013)
60. See, e.g., Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses: How the Deal Is Done, Part I, LANDSLIDE, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 35, 38-39.
61. Lemley, supra note 14, at 158-59; Gil Ohana, Marc Hansen & Omar Shah, Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to Adoption of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 644, 648-50 (2003)
62. Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 741-42 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Robert A. Skitol, Esq., Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP at 3 (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ-VITA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.pdf
64. Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP at 10-11 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.pdf.
65. European Comm'n, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, ¶ 299, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF.
66. See, e.g., DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 2, at 50; CLAUDIA TAPIA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND LICENSING PRACTICES (FRAND) IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 170 (2010)
67. Richard S. Taffet, Presentation to AIPLA Spring Meeting, Ex Ante Licensing in Standards Development: Myths and Reality 15 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=2742
68. MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 336-37 (2009)
69. Andrew L. Russell, Constructing Legitimacy: The W3C's Patent Policy, in OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY 159-172 (Laura DeNardis ed., 2011)
70. Andrew Updegrove, Ex Ante Disclosure: Risks, Rewards, Process and Alternatives, CONSORTIUM STANDARDS BULL., June 2006, at 11-12
71. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12-13 (2003).
72. Industry Royalty Rate Data Summary, LICENSING ECON. REV., Dec. 2005, at 6-7
73. see also WILLIAM J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH ANALYSIS 253 (2012)
74. See David L. Newman, Going Once⋯ Going Twice⋯ Licensed Under the Most Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Bidding Terms!, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROp. 139 (2013)
75. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005)
76. Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of Market Power in Standard Setting Organizations (Apr. 2007) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979393.
77. Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889 (2011)
78. This approach was highlighted in Lucent Techs., Inc. V. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
79. see also Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 675-79 (2007)
80. F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier: Identifying Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 48, 83-85 (2009)
81. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627 (2010)
82. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661 (2010).
83. Princo Corp. V. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
84. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Gerrard [sic] R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter MPEG Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.htm
85. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter DVD 3C Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm
86. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter DVD 6C Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf.
87. For the history of the evolution of patent pools germane to industry standards see SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 1, at 206-24; Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2004)
88. Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103 (2012).
89. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 130-31 (2d ed. 2011)
90. FCC. Vizio, Inc. V. Funai Electric Co., 24 FCC Rcd. 2880 (2009)
91. Vizio, Inc. V. International Trade Commission, 605 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
92. AAC License Fees, VIA LICENSING, http://www.vialicensing.com/licensing/aac-fees.aspx.
93. Royalty Rates Under DVD6C Licensing Program, DVD6C LICENSING GROUP, http://www.dvd6cla.com/royaltyrate.html
94. See, e.g., Essentiality Report, DVD6C LICENSING GROUP, http://www.dvd6cla.com/essential.html
95. Press Release, IEEE Standards Ass'n, IEEE 8.2.11 Patent Pool Exploratory Forum Launched (Aug. 6, 2012), http://standards.ieee.org/news/2012/802pat.html
96. Carter Eltzroth, IPR Policy of the DVB Project: Negative Disclosure, FRAND Arbitration Unless Pool Rules OK, Part 2, INT'L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES., July-Dec. 2009, at 1, 1-6
97. World Health Org., Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical Technologies 67-76 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/WHOTCM2005.1-OMS.pdf
98. Press Release, Nokia, Nokia Advocates Industry-Wide Commitment to 5% Cumulative IPR Royalty for WCDMA (May 8, 2002), available at http://press.nokia.com/2002/05/08/nokia-advocates-industry-wide-commitment-to-5-cumulative-ipr-royalty-for-wcdma/.
99. Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent (SEP) Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2014)
100. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 1 (Stan. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2243026, 2013)
101. Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4410 (Jul. 23, 2013) (decision and order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf.
102. Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts 6 (CEMFI Working Paper No. 1203, Feb. 2012), available at http://www.cemfi.es/ftp/wp/1203.pdf.
103. George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2011)
104. George S. Cary, Larry C. Work-Dembowski & Paul S. Hayes, Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1241 (2008)
105. Christopher B. Hockett & Rosanna G. Lipscomb, Best FRANDs Forever? Standard-Setting Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 19-25
106. Adam Speegle, Note, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the Standard-Setting Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847 (2012)
107. See, e.g., DOJ/PTO Policy Statement, supra note 16; BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT HOLDERS (2012)
108. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012)
109. Colleen Chien et al., RAND Patents and Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International Trade Commission (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2102865.
110. Albert A. Foer & Sandeep Vaheesan, AAI Request for Joint Enforcement Guidelines on the Patent Policies of Standard Setting Organizations 17 (May 23, 2013) (petition to the DOJ and FTC), available at http://antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/Request%20for%20Joint%20Enforcement%20Guidelines%20on%20the%20Patent%20Policies%20of%20Standard%20Setting%20Organizations.pdf.