-
1
-
-
84857959991
-
-
Note
-
In this context, it is useful to note that the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm the rule that a patent does not create a presumption of market power in antitrust litigation. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
0010550194
-
The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law
-
49-50 ("[T]he right to exclude another from 'manufacture, use, and sale' may give no significant market power, even when the patent covers a product that is sold in the market.")
-
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 249-50 (1994) ("[T]he right to exclude another from 'manufacture, use, and sale' may give no significant market power, even when the patent covers a product that is sold in the market.").
-
(1994)
J. LEGAL STUD
, vol.23
, pp. 247
-
-
Dam, K.W.1
-
3
-
-
78649869231
-
Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology
-
(Stanley L. Engerman, Philip T. Hoffman, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., Cambridge Univ. Press)
-
See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1870-1920 (Stanley L. Engerman, Philip T. Hoffman, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
-
(2003)
FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1870-1920
-
-
Lamoreaux, N.R.1
Sokoloff, K.L.2
-
4
-
-
0038970650
-
History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States
-
B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 233 (2001).
-
(2001)
J. ECON. PERSP
, vol.15
, pp. 233
-
-
Zorina Khan, B.1
Sokoloff, K.L.2
-
5
-
-
84857959990
-
-
Note
-
See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (approvingly providing extensive review of legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act and its impact on the patent-antitrust interface).
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
13244264816
-
The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property
-
For more on the 1952 Patent Act's impact on the patent-antitrust interface
-
For more on the 1952 Patent Act's impact on the patent-antitrust interface, see F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (2004).
-
(2004)
GEO. WASH. L. REV
, vol.73
, pp. 174
-
-
Scott Kieff, F.1
Paredes, T.A.2
-
7
-
-
0347298363
-
The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws
-
(five-part series of articles written by principal drafter of the 1952 Patent Act)
-
Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 241 (1942) (five-part series of articles written by principal drafter of the 1952 Patent Act).
-
(1942)
J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
, vol.24
, pp. 241
-
-
Rich, G.S.1
-
8
-
-
84857973585
-
-
Note
-
Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) (noting "[t]here can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but steady drift of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents"); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J.) (noting "§ 103... restores the original gloss. .. [A] legislature... must be free to reinstate the courts' initial interpretation, even though it may have been obscured by a series of later comments whose upshot is at best hazy."); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, C.J., concurring) (discussing the role of predictable rules for patent enforcement in helping a smaller "David" compete with a larger "Goliath").
-
-
-
-
9
-
-
84857941281
-
-
Note
-
See infra Part IV.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
84857986476
-
-
Note
-
FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 22 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
-
-
-
-
11
-
-
0003923331
-
-
For more on government hold-up of firms in regulated industries, see DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 603 (1989).
-
(1989)
Regulation and Markets
, pp. 603
-
-
Spulber, D.F.1
-
12
-
-
0011359366
-
Sequential Equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms
-
David Besanko & Daniel F. Spulber, Sequential Equilibrium Investment by Regulated Firms, 23 RAND J. ECON. 153 (1992).
-
(1992)
Rand J. Econ.
, vol.23
, pp. 153
-
-
Besanko, D.1
Spulber, D.F.2
-
13
-
-
85077597484
-
The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm
-
Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm, 25 RAND J. ECON. 424 (1994).
-
(1994)
Rand J. Econ.
, vol.25
, pp. 424
-
-
Spiegel, Y.1
Spulber, D.F.2
-
14
-
-
0031475953
-
Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives
-
Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives, 28 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1997).
-
(1997)
Rand J. Econ.
, vol.28
, pp. 1
-
-
Spiegel, Y.1
Spulber, D.F.2
-
15
-
-
0009868976
-
Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?
-
On municipalities their opportunism towards cable firms
-
On municipalities and their opportunism towards cable firms, see Mark Zupan, Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?, 20 RAND J. ECON. 473 (1989).
-
(1989)
Rand J. Econ.
, vol.20
, pp. 473
-
-
Zupan, M.1
-
16
-
-
0030520277
-
Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract
-
On government hold-up and related case law
-
On government hold-up and related case law, see J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996).
-
(1996)
N.Y.U. L. REV.
, vol.71
, pp. 851
-
-
Gregory Sidak, J.1
Spulber, D.F.2
-
18
-
-
84857989578
-
-
For a more formal treatment of the present example of government hold-up at the interface between patents and antitrust, (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 11-3)
-
For a more formal treatment of the present example of government hold-up at the interface between patents and antitrust, see Luke Froeb, Bernhard Ganglmair & Gregory J. Werden, Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper, Paper No. 11-3, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735587.
-
(2010)
Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation
-
-
Froeb, L.1
Ganglmair, B.2
Werden, J.3
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19
-
-
1842764749
-
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property
-
See also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
-
(2004)
U. CHI. L. REV.
, vol.71
, pp. 129
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
-
20
-
-
84857941293
-
-
Note
-
Lemley refers to a difference between a view of patents as providing incentives to inventors before inventions are made and a view of patents as providing incentives for patentees to control inventions after they have been made. But, that is a very specialized understanding of the terms "ex ante" and "ex post" focused entirely on the perspective of specific parties in particular, rather than in terms of how decisions are made over time by all parties in the innovation market. It also does not address the school of thought that led to the present U.S. patent system, the 1952 Patent Act, which views patents as tools for facilitating coordination rather than as direct incentives to invent or as tools for exercising control.
-
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-
-
21
-
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84857960198
-
An Inconvenient School of Thought
-
(reviewing MICHAEL CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ANTITRUST (2009)). The focus by the FTC and some academics on such particularized uses of the term "ex ante" may be an example of a regulatory form of behavioral cognitive bias
-
See F. Scott Kieff, An Inconvenient School of Thought, 61 ALA. L. REV. 591 (2010), (reviewing MICHAEL CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & ANTITRUST (2009)). The focus by the FTC and some academics on such particularized uses of the term "ex ante" may be an example of a regulatory form of behavioral cognitive bias.
-
(2010)
ALA. L. REV.
, vol.61
, pp. 591
-
-
Scott Kieff, F.1
-
23
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-
69849093619
-
Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects & Downstream Access
-
381-84
-
F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects & Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L. J. 327, 381-84 (2006).
-
(2006)
EMORY L. J.
, vol.56
, pp. 327
-
-
Scott Kieff, F.1
-
24
-
-
41149170536
-
Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation
-
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003).
-
(2003)
WASH. U. L.Q
, vol.81
, pp. 417
-
-
Paredes, T.A.1
-
27
-
-
84857986479
-
-
Note
-
This corresponds to the so-called "fundamental transformation" that is the focus of the well-known discussion of hold-up by Williamson.
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
84857941297
-
-
Note
-
Strictly speaking, SSOs themselves are organizations rather than institutions, but we refer to them as institutions to encourage focus on the rules that govern them and the enforcement characteristics of those rules.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
84886764074
-
-
(explaining in more detail the relationship between institutions and organizations as terms of art in the field of New Institutional Economics)
-
See Douglass C. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, available at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html (explaining in more detail the relationship between institutions and organizations as terms of art in the field of New Institutional Economics).
-
Nobel Prize Lecture
-
-
North, D.C.1
-
31
-
-
84857973592
-
-
Note
-
ALLIANCE FOR TELECOMM. INDUS. SOLUTIONS, COMMENTS ON P11-1204 at 1 (June 14, 2011) ["ATIS Comments"] ("ATIS has not experienced the hold up problem"); INT'L COMM. FOR INFO. TECH. STANDARDS, COMMENTS ON P11-1204 at 1 (June 20, 2011) ("The current officers and staff have not been notified of any active patent 'hold-up' problems with regards to INCITS standards."); TELECOMMS. INDUS. ASSOC., COMMENTS ON P11-1204 at 4 (June 14, 2011) ("TIA has never received any complaints regarding such 'patent hold-up' and does not agree that 'patent holdup' is plaguing the information and telecommunications technology (ICT) standard development processes.").
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
84857941296
-
About ANSI Overview
-
(last visited Aug. 1 2011)
-
About ANSI Overview, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
-
AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST
-
-
-
33
-
-
84857941303
-
-
Note
-
Comments of AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. ("ANSI"), FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE and REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (June 21, 2011), at 5 ("There may be adverse consequences if an unintentional failure to disclose an essential patent precludes an SDO participant from asserting its intellectual property rights against implementers of the standard and from seeking RAND royalties and terms.").
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
84857943047
-
-
Note
-
Am. Intellectual Property Ass'n, COMMENTS ON P11-1204 at 2 (June 14, 2011) ("To best encourage invention and competition, IPR owners and users-i.e., licensees-of IPR-protected technology must remain free to negotiate all the terms of their licenses to strike the right balance for their particular circumstances.")
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
0001445105
-
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting
-
(Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., MIT Press)
-
See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., MIT Press 2001).
-
(2001)
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
, vol.1
, pp. 119
-
-
Shapiro, C.1
-
36
-
-
34547733961
-
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
-
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
-
(2007)
TEX. L. REV.
, vol.85
, pp. 1991
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
Shapiro, C.2
-
37
-
-
84857986485
-
-
Note
-
Although the FTC and some scholars are concerned about unlikely opportunism problems relating to potential patent thickets, patent gridlock, and patent anticommons, the more likely problems are those the literatures in law and economics and new institutional social science associate with the labels "government-created permit thickets" and "license Raj."
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
80053040462
-
Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There is Too Little, Not Too Much Private Property
-
See Richard A. Epstein, Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There is Too Little, Not Too Much Private Property, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 51 (2010).
-
(2010)
ARIZ. L. REV.
, vol.53
, pp. 51
-
-
Epstein, R.A.1
-
40
-
-
69849093618
-
On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith's Delineating Entitlements in Information
-
106-09
-
See also F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith's Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 106-09 (2007).
-
(2007)
YALE L.J. POCKET PART
, vol.117
, pp. 101
-
-
Scott Kieff, F.1
-
41
-
-
0029497372
-
The Permit Power Meets the Constitution
-
(discussing "permit thickets")
-
(Building on Richard. A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407 (1995) (discussing "permit thickets").
-
(1995)
IOWA L. REV.
, vol.81
, pp. 407
-
-
Epstein, R.A.1
-
42
-
-
0005564122
-
A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India
-
1608, (discussing "license Raj")
-
Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (discussing "license Raj").
-
(1997)
VA. L. REV.
, vol.83
, pp. 1593
-
-
Parikh, S.1
Weingast, B.R.2
-
44
-
-
0000259630
-
The Boundaries of Private Property
-
1174-75
-
Critiquing Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999).
-
(1999)
YALE L. J.
, vol.108
, pp. 1163
-
-
Heller, M.A.1
-
45
-
-
0032076909
-
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research
-
700
-
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 700 (1998).
-
(1998)
SCI
, vol.280
, pp. 698
-
-
Heller, M.A.1
Eisenberg, R.S.2
-
46
-
-
84924744378
-
-
See, e.g., DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (2009).
-
(2009)
THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS
-
-
Spulber, D.F.1
-
48
-
-
69849085517
-
On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance and Innovation
-
236-40 (providing a general review of institutional details that can make property rights operate "at their best" or "at their worst")
-
Stephen Haber, F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 215, 236-40 (2008) (providing a general review of institutional details that can make property rights operate "at their best" or "at their worst").
-
(2008)
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
, vol.26
, pp. 215
-
-
Haber, S.1
Scott Kieff, F.2
Paredes, T.A.3
-
49
-
-
84857973597
-
-
Note
-
Regrettably, some confusion surrounding the term "hold-up" may be caused by the extensive citation in the economic literature to a purportedly canonical example that has been proven factually incorrect.
-
-
-
-
50
-
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33646229086
-
The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors
-
See, Ronald Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 255 (2006).
-
(2006)
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
, vol.15
, pp. 255
-
-
Coase, R.1
-
52
-
-
0003531998
-
-
A recent survey finds 900 empirical articles citing to this work, and the number is growing. The theoretical literature is probably even larger
-
See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61-63 (1985). A recent survey finds 900 empirical articles citing to this work, and the number is growing (http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol10/iss1/art1/). The theoretical literature is probably even larger.
-
(1985)
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
, pp. 61-63
-
-
Williamson, O.1
-
53
-
-
39449112409
-
Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up
-
603-04
-
Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603-04 (2007).
-
(2007)
Antitrust L.J.
, vol.74
, pp. 603
-
-
Farrell, J.1
Hayes, J.2
Shapiro, C.3
Sullivan, T.4
-
54
-
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84857943052
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-
Note
-
See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906). See also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905), where a taking was allowed for irrigation ditch that was "absolutely necessary" to service a plot of land that was otherwise arid and valueless. The use of eminent domain eliminates the holdout problem, but the requirement of just compensation for the value of the property taken guards against the risk of expropriation.
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
84857941309
-
-
Note
-
See infra Part IV.
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
84857943056
-
-
Note
-
QUALCOMM, INC., COMMENTS ON P11-1204 at 8 (June 13, 2011) ("Qualcomm has not encountered a situation in which 'late' identification of particular essential patent claims (or applications) by an SSO member that has given a categorical RAND commitment has altered the price of, or negotiating dynamic for, a license.").
-
-
-
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57
-
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84857943055
-
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Note
-
See infra Appendix, which sets forth a set of representative excerpts from existing Qualcomm license agreements that relate to future technology standards.
-
-
-
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58
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84857973604
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Note
-
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
-
-
-
-
59
-
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84857986494
-
-
Note
-
The traditional equitable analysis within the test for injunctions wisely asked only whether someone otherwise entitled to an injunction should not get one, in the judge's discretion, in light of a hardship on the defendant that could be shown to be grossly disproportionate.
-
-
-
-
60
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0009992505
-
A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules
-
2102
-
See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997).
-
(1997)
YALE L.J.
, vol.106
, pp. 2091
-
-
Epstein, R.A.1
-
61
-
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84888870262
-
Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits
-
1045-46
-
Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 22 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1045-46 (1964).
-
(1964)
U. PA. L. REV.
, vol.22
, pp. 1025
-
-
Schwartz, H.F.1
-
62
-
-
84857941316
-
-
Note
-
42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions, § 35 (2005).
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
0036961271
-
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations
-
(showing that SSOs often adopt RAND agreements)
-
See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (showing that SSOs often adopt RAND agreements).
-
(2002)
CAL. L. REV.
, vol.90
, pp. 1889
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
-
64
-
-
84857986558
-
-
Note
-
There is wide consensus that RAND does not, and should not, mean "the same terms for everyone," but instead means something closer to "similarly situated licensees are entitled to similar terms," at most.
-
-
-
-
66
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84857981414
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-
Note
-
Some considerable flexibility in terms (including rates) is industry standard. On the other hand, we suspect that substantial (for example, 2-fold) price discrimination merely to take maximum advantage of the higher demand of some licensees, without some additional counterbalancing value flowing to the licensor, would be widely considered inconsistent with a RAND commitment. To use the language of general public utility regulation, cost-based price discrimination is needed to encourage efficient utilization. Demand-based price discrimination is more difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, it allows for rent extraction. On the other hand, the higher rates charged to higher demanders may soak up a larger fraction of fixed costs which allow lower demanders to participate in the market. We do not address these complications here. Certainly we do not want to suggest a belief that there is complete freedom to price discriminate in the face of a RAND commitment.
-
-
-
-
67
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84857971675
-
-
Note
-
For example, Nokia and Qualcomm had a huge and intense litigation over RAND in 2007-08 that settled the morning of trial. Both of those parties had large cellular patent portfolios that made sense to cross-license, which they are reported to have accomplished through a lengthy agreement. According to public reports, the settlement also included a sale of a large patent portfolio from Nokia to Qualcomm, and cleared the way for the parties to enter into other mutually advantageous, complex, and ongoing business relationships.
-
-
-
-
68
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84857973600
-
-
Press Release, Nokia, Nokia and Qualcomm Plan to Develop Advanced Mobile Devices (Feb
-
See, e.g., Press Release, Nokia, Nokia and Qualcomm Plan to Develop Advanced Mobile Devices (Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://press.nokia.com/2009/02/17/nokia-and-qualcomm-plan-to-develop-advanced-mobile-devices/.
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2009)
, vol.17
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69
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84857986557
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Press Release, Qualcomm Inc., Nokia and Qualcomm Plan to Develop Advanced Mobile Devices (Feb. 17 2009)
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Press Release, Qualcomm Inc., Nokia and Qualcomm Plan to Develop Advanced Mobile Devices (Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.qualcomm.com/media/releases/2009/02/17/nokia-and-qualcomm-plan-develop-advanced-mobile-devices.
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70
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84857981412
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Nokia and Qualcomm to Develop New 3G Handsets
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Feb. 17
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Paul Taylor, Nokia and Qualcomm to Develop New 3G Handsets, FT.COM, Feb. 17, 2009.
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(2009)
FT.COM
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Taylor, P.1
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71
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84857986559
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Nokia, Qualcomm Team up to Deliver Symbian Devices
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Feb. 17
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W. David Gardner, Nokia, Qualcomm Team up to Deliver Symbian Devices, INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 17, 2009.
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(2009)
INFORMATIONWEEK
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David Gardner, W.1
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72
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Nokia And Qualcomm: Happy Together
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Apr. 21
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Elizabeth Woyke, Nokia And Qualcomm: Happy Together, FORBES.COM, Apr. 21, 2009.
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(2009)
FORBES.COM.
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Woyke, E.1
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73
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84857981416
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Note
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Nokia picks Qualcomm for Windows phone, Seeks Others, REUTERS, May 20, 2011. Such success in striking a deal to resolve even a highly heated dispute reveals a great deal about the relative power of private ordering constraints including the recognition by both parties that they each benefit from smooth repeat interactions since they "live in the same neighborhood" compared to the power of factors that are the focus of the behavioral economics literature, such as irrational cognitive bias and animosity. If the real-world relative impact of these factors had cut the other way, then Nokia and Qualcomm would not have been successful in moving very quickly from all-out war to identifying and seizing joint business opportunities.
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74
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84857971679
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ETSI, ETSI GUIDE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS) §§ 2.3, 4.1 (Nov. 27 2008), (last visited Aug. 1 2011).
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See, e.g., ETSI, ETSI GUIDE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS) §§ 2.3, 4.1 (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_Guide_on_IPRs.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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75
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84857981411
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AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANSI PATENT POLICY § III.B (Feb. 2011), (last visited Aug. 1 2011)
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AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANSI PATENT POLICY § III.B (Feb. 2011), available at http:// publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/Guidelines%20for%20Implementation%20of%20ANSI%20Patent%20Policy%202011.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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76
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VITA STANDARDS ORG., VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.3.4
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VITA STANDARDS ORG., VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.3.4, available at http://www.vita.com/home/VSO/vso-pp-r2d6.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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2011)
, vol.1
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77
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53349174078
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See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 29-72 (2008).
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(2008)
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK
, pp. 29-72
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Bessen, J.1
Meurer, M.J.2
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78
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84857986564
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Note
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[35] U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1-2 (setting forth the disclosure requirements of patent law known as "enablement," "written description," "best mode," and "definiteness").
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79
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84857986563
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Note
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NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011).
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80
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84857981422
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Note
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i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858-60 (Fed. Cir. 2010); aff 'd sub nom Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011).
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81
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84857981421
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Note
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The Rambus case involved four technologies that were patented by Rambus and that were included in a memory chip standard developed by an SSO of which Rambus was a member. Rambus left the SSO after it became apparent that the SSO's required licensing terms were not compatible with Rambus's intended terms. Litigation and an FTC complaint ensued. The administrative law judge dismissed the FTC complaint, but the Commission reversed, holding that Rambus willfully engaged in misrepresentations. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the Commission's orders. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 459-62 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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82
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84857981418
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Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay 35 (2005).300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13 2005), (last visited Aug. 1 2011): Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. (Samsung), a Korean manufacturer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) and its U.S. subsidiary, Samsung Semiconductor Inc., have agreed to plead guilty and to pay a 35 (2005).300 million fine for participating in an international conspiracy to fix prices in the DRAM market, the Department of Justice announced. Samsung's fine is the second largest criminal antitrust fine in U. S. history and the largest criminal fine since 1999... Including today's charge, three companies and five individuals have been charged and fines totaling more than 35 (2005).646 million have resulted from the Department's ongoing antitrust investigation into price fixing in the DRAM industry
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See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_at_540.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011): Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. (Samsung), a Korean manufacturer of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) and its U.S. subsidiary, Samsung Semiconductor Inc., have agreed to plead guilty and to pay a $300 million fine for participating in an international conspiracy to fix prices in the DRAM market, the Department of Justice announced. Samsung's fine is the second largest criminal antitrust fine in U.S. history and the largest criminal fine since 1999....Including today's charge, three companies and five individuals have been charged and fines totaling more than 35 (2005).646 million have resulted from the Department's ongoing antitrust investigation into price fixing in the DRAM industry.
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83
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0004066308
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("It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.")
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See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 20 (1921) ("It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.").
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(1921)
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT
, pp. 20
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Knight, F.1
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84
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84857986569
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Note
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For a summary of the difficulties, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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85
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84857986568
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Note
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For the appropriate rules, see U.C.C. § 2-712 (2003) ("Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods): (1)After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller. (2)The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. The economic "cost of cover" may also include loss of value because identical cover is not available, as where the buyer of a long-term contract is forced to find its cover in a short-term market. See, e.g., Mo. Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1881).
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84857981426
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Note
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As the Federal Circuit put it: A patentee is entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty on an infringer's sales for which the patentee has not established entitlement to lost profits. The royalty may be based upon... the supposed result of hypothetical negotiations between the plaintiff and defendant. The hypothetical negotiation requires the court to envision the terms of a licensing agreement reached as the result of a supposed meeting between the patentee and the infringer at the time infringement began. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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88
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22144461985
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Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game
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1100-01, (explaining that the willfulness doctrine "creates a strong incentive not to read patents")
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See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003) (explaining that the willfulness doctrine "creates a strong incentive not to read patents").
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(2003)
BERKELEY TECH. L.J
, vol.18
, pp. 1085
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Lemley, M.A.1
Tangri, R.K.2
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89
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79955968759
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The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law
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404 ("[T]he ever-looming danger of treble damages resulting from a finding of willful infringement creates perverse incentives to remain ignorant of patented technology.")
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Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 404 (2010) ("[T]he ever-looming danger of treble damages resulting from a finding of willful infringement creates perverse incentives to remain ignorant of patented technology.").
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(2010)
HARV. J.L. & TECH
, vol.23
, pp. 401
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Devlin, A.1
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90
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18144415464
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The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof)
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Note, 2020 (referring to a "perverse incentive for potential infringers not to become too aware")
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Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2020 (2005) (referring to a "perverse incentive for potential infringers not to become too aware").
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(2005)
HARV. L. REV.
, vol.118
, pp. 2007
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91
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The 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape for Electronic Companies
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353-54 (Mar. 2005) (reporting that "many companies implemented policies to discourage or forbid patent searching by inventors and patent attorneys")
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Robert Greene Sterne, Michael Q. Lee, Patrick E. Garrett, Michael V. Messinger & Donald R. Manowit, The 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape for Electronic Companies, 823 PRACTISING L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 293, 353-54 (Mar. 2005) (reporting that "many companies implemented policies to discourage or forbid patent searching by inventors and patent attorneys").
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PRACTISING L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
, vol.823
, pp. 293
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Sterne, R.G.1
Lee, M.Q.2
Garrett, P.E.3
Messinger, M.V.4
Manowit, D.R.5
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92
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0002642594
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Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation
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(formally describing second-mover advantages)
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See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND. J. ECON. 70 (1985) (formally describing second-mover advantages).
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(1985)
RAND. J. ECON.
, vol.16
, pp. 70
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Farrell, J.1
Saloner, G.2
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93
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0002098717
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The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings
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(H. Landis Gabel ed., North-Holland 1987) (providing illustrative examples of second-mover advantages)
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Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 1 (H. Landis Gabel ed., North-Holland 1987) (providing illustrative examples of second-mover advantages).
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PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
, pp. 1
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Farrell, J.1
Saloner, G.2
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84857986562
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Note
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See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 3, 20-96 (1995).
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95
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84857959988
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Note
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As the Federal Circuit has stated on several occasions: "The hypothetical negotiation requires the court to envision the terms of a licensing agreement reached as the result of a supposed meeting between the patentee and the infringer at the time infringement began." Minks v. Polaris Indus., 546 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). See also Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("The hypothetical negotiation 'attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began,' and 'necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty.'") (quoting Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
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96
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84857959989
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Note
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The FTC approach also runs afoul of the classic make-or-buy decision that has been famously studied in depth over the past century of economic research into the boundary between the business firm and the market. That extensive literature has conclusively shown that the serious efficiency tradeoffs are so varied and complex that one solution most assuredly does not fit all cases. The FTC states that lost profits damages will never be appropriate when the patentee does not manufacture a product. Id. at 143. But why? The essence of efficient markets is specialization by function. There is nothing sinister or illegal about gathering together a suite of patents that is then licensed on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis to other parties that use them to manufacture. The nonexclusive license is of critical importance in this regard because it allows the same advanced technology to be licensed to firms in an entire industry. The lost profits measure of damage is therefore as appropriate for these licensing cases as it is for any manufacturing cases. There is no reason whatsoever for the law to favor those firms that integrate internally over those that integrate across the market. It is thus a mistake to undermine the willingness to license by depriving the licensee of the remedies that make the system go. As between the licensor and licensees, contracts can handle the relevant issues.
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97
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84857986565
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Note
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Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (reviewing fifteen factors).
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98
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84857986567
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Note
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The FTC Report seems to recognize this possibility whose implications it ignores in examining damages options: One way a patentee can innovate is to develop and commercialize the invention itself. For a patentee producing a patented product, the primary importance of the patent is often the right it confers to exclude competitors from making and selling a competing product incorporating the patented technology. Often the most effective way to remedy infringement in this context is by awarding the patentee its profits on sales of the patented product that it lost due to the infringement.
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99
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84857981425
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Note
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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100
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78650043745
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Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research and Development
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("Since 1992, the number of biotech patents granted has increased substantially, and the industry has more than tripled in size. New biotech drug and vaccine approvals rose from two in 1982 to thirty-five in 2002.")
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See, e.g., Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359 (2004) ("Since 1992, the number of biotech patents granted has increased substantially, and the industry has more than tripled in size. New biotech drug and vaccine approvals rose from two in 1982 to thirty-five in 2002.").
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(2004)
EMORY L.J
, vol.53
, pp. 359
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Ramirez, H.H.1
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Note
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Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 62 (1972).
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102
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84857981423
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Note
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In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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103
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84857971677
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According to its own patent information database, Google is the original assignee of over 550 U.S. patents. Google Patents, U.S. Patent 6,285,999, the patent on PageRank, the foundational algorithm for Google's search technology, is owned by Stanford University and exclusively licensed to Google
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According to its own patent information database, Google is the original assignee of over 550 U.S. patents. Google Patents, http://google.com/patents. U.S. Patent 6,285,999, the patent on PageRank, the foundational algorithm for Google's search technology, is owned by Stanford University and exclusively licensed to Google.
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Starting Up: How Google Got Its Groove
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Nov.-Dec, (last visited Aug. 1 2011). Google also recently acquired over 1000 patents from IBM
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Richard Brandt, Starting Up: How Google Got Its Groove, STANFORD MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2004, available at http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2004/novdec/features/startingup.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). Google also recently acquired over 1000 patents from IBM.
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(2004)
STANFORD MAG
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Brandt, R.1
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105
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Google Acquires Over 1,000 IBM Patents
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July 29, (last visited Aug. 1 2011)
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Don Reisinger, Google Acquires Over 1,000 IBM Patents, CNET, July 29, 2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20085418-17/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
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(2011)
CNET
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Reisinger, D.1
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Note
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Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, C.J., concurring).
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